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ABSTRACT 
 
Radiopharmaceuticals are radiation-emitting substances used in medicine for radiotherapy and imaging 
diagnosis. A Research Institute, located in Rio de Janeiro, produces three radiopharmaceuticals: the sodium 
iodate is used in the diagnosis of thyroid dysfunctions, the meta-iodo-benzylguanidine is used in the diagnosis of 
cardiac diseases, and the fluordesoxyglucose is used in diagnosis in cardiology, oncology, neurology and 
neuropsychiatry. This paper presents a leading safety performance indicators framework to assess the resilience 
of radiopharmaceuticals production processes. The organizations that use resilience indicators will be able to 
proactively evaluate and manage safety. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Contemporary  view  on  safety  emphasizes  that  safety  critical organizations  should  be  
able  to  proactively  evaluate  and  manage safety  of  their  activities.  This proactivity 
should be endorsed in the organizational safety management. Safety, however, is a 
phenomenon that is hard to describe measure, confirm, and manage.  Technical reliability is 
affected by the performance of the employees. Furthermore, the effect of the management 
actions, working conditions and the culture of the organization can not be ignored when 
evaluating the overall safety of the activities. 
 
Scientists  in  the  field of  safety critical organizations  state  that  safety emerges  when  an  
organization  is  willing  and  capable of  working according to the demands of their task, and 
when  they understand the changing  vulnerabilities of their work [1][2][3][4].  Adopting  this 
point of view we  state  that managing  the  organization  and  its  sociotechnical phenomena  
is the essence of  management  of  safety [5]. Thus, management of safety relies on a 
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systematic anticipation, monitoring and development of organizational performance. Various 
safety indicators play a key role in providing information on current organizational safety 
performance.  An increasing emphasis has been placed also on the role of indicators in 
providing information to be used in anticipation and development of organizational 
performance.  These indicators are called leading indicators.   
 
The safety performance indicators that have commonly been used have often been lagging – 
measuring outcomes of activities or things and events that have already happened. In order to 
be able to monitor the  effects  of  proactive  safety  work  as  well  as  anticipate 
vulnerabilities  the  organizations  should  define  leading  indicators. Those should be able to 
grasp organizational practices and processes that antecede (lead) changes in safety 
performance of the organization. Hollnagel [6] calls this kind of control feed-forward control. 
This kind of control relies on anticipated effects instead of past outcomes contrary to the 
traditional feedback-based safety management. 
 
The categorization of safety performance  indicators  into  lead and  lag is  dependent  on  the  
underlying  model  of  safety.  If  one  has  a mechanistic  and  technical-oriented  view  on  
nuclear  safety,  near-misses  can  be  considered  leading  indicators.  More  systemic  and 
dynamic  view  of  an  organization  and  system  safety would  not  view near-misses  as  
leading  indicators,  rather  more  as  indicators  of  past safety  performance.  Another  
typical  safety  model  emphasizes  the latent  failures  (pathogens)  of  the  sociotechnical  
system  as  creating conditions for accident [7].    
 
Several reasons for using leading indicators have been proposed in the literature: they provide 
information  on  where  to  focus  improvement efforts, they  direct  attention  to  proactive  
measures  of  safety management  rather  than  reactive  follow  up  of  negative occurrences 
or trending of events, they  provide  early warning  signs  on  potential weak  areas  or 
vulnerabilities  in  the  organizational  risk  control  system  or technology, they  focus  on  
precursors  to  undesired  events  rather  than  the undesired events themselves,  they  provide  
information  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  safety efforts underway and  they  tell about  the 
organizational  health,  not only  sickness or absence of it.   
 
The term organizational resilience signifies a capacity to maintain or restore an acceptable 
level of functioning despite perturbations or failures. This definition incorporates the 
concepts of systems approach, risks acceptability, anticipation and adaptation to disturbance. 
Hollnagel et al. [3] defines the resilience as the ability of a system to recover after a 
disruption. 
 
Woods [8] reports that a resilient organization has the ability to create ways to anticipate the 
risk, before failures occur. The term Resilience Engineering represents a new way of thinking 
about safety. Whereas conventional risk management approaches are based on hindsight and 
emphasize error tabulation and calculation of failure probabilities. Resilience Engineering 
looks for ways to enhance the ability of organizations to create processes that are robust yet 
flexible, to monitor and revise risk models, and to use resources proactively in the face of 
disruptions or ongoing production and economic pressures. 
 
According to Wreathall [9] the indicators are development and in way that can identify 
potential concerns in the plant’s performance based on process that translates broad themes 
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into specific plant issues. This author identified some themes or properties relevant to 
resilient organizations: 
 
• Top-level commitment: Top management recognizes the human performance concerns 
and tries to address them, infusing the organization with a sense of significance of 
human performance, and is seen to value human performance, both in word and deed. 
• Learning culture: A shorthand version of this theme is “How much does the 
organization respond to events with denial versus repair or true reform?” 
• Flexibility: It is the ability of the organization to adapt to new or complex problems in 
a way that maximizes its ability to solve the problem without disrupting overall 
functionality. It requires that people at the working level are able to make important 
decisions without having to wait unnecessarily for management instructions. 
• Just culture: Supports the reporting of issues up through the organization, yet not 
tolerating culpable behaviors. Without a just culture, the willingness of the workers to 
report problems will be much diminished, thereby limiting the ability of the 
organization to learn about weaknesses in its current defenses. 
• Awareness: Data gathering that provides management with insights about what is 
going on regarding the quality of human performance at the plant, the extent to which 
it is a problem, and the current state of the defenses. 
• Preparedness: “Being ahead” of the problems in human performance. The 
organization actively anticipates problems and prepares for them. 
 
The true challenge has been to translate the themes into observable actions – leading 
indicators – that can be monitored [9]. 
 
This work presents a leading indicators framework to assess the resilience of the 
radiopharmaceuticals production plant at Rio de Janeiro. This framework was based on the 
six major themes or properties relevant to resilient organizations (resilience engineering 
principles): top-level commitment, awareness, preparedness, flexibility, just culture and 
learning culture. 
 
 
2. RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTION 
 
Radiopharmaceuticals are radiation-emitting substances used in medicine for radiotherapy 
and imaging diagnosis. A Research Institute, located in Rio de Janeiro, produces three 
radiopharmaceuticals: the sodium iodate is used in the diagnosis of thyroid dysfunctions, the 
meta-iodo-benzylguanidine is used in the diagnosis of cardiac diseases, and the 
fluordesoxyglucose is used in diagnosis in cardiology, oncology, neurology and 
neuropsychiatry. 
 
The production of radiopharmaceuticals is a dangerous and complex process that involves the 
activities of irradiation, processing and expedition of radiopharmaceuticals. The risk of 
exposure and contamination due to handling of radioactive substances can cause harm to the 
workers. Workers also face time pressure problems, because of the short-life of the 
radiopharmaceuticals which ensures the least possible harm to the patient's body, but requires 
that it be used within a short period. Moreover, the production of radiopharmaceuticals has 
many sources of variability: seasonal variations in demand, variations resulting from failures 
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in particle accelerators, varieties of raw materials and inputs, changes in procedures and 
regulations, and in other instructions. 
A radioprotection group supports the production of radiopharmaceuticals at institute, 
ensuring that product manufacturing, quality control, expedition and transportation match the 
safety requirements.  
 
3. LEADING SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FRAMEWORK 
 
Selection  of  safety  indicators  should  always  start  from  the consideration  of  what  are  
the  key  issues  to  monitor,  manage  and change. Only after these issues have been 
identified should one start to define safety management actions  that seek  to address  the key  
issues as  well  as  indicators  to  help  the  process.  The  safety  indicators  are utilized  as  
part  of  the  safety  management  process,  not  as  an independent  goal  or  function  as  
such.  The  role  of  the  safety performance  indicators  is  to  provide  information  on  
safety, motivate  people  to  work  on  safety  and  contribute  to  change towards increased 
safety. 
 
When  selecting  the  indicators  it  is  important  first  to  consider  what needs to be 
monitored and not how these are monitored [10]. Otherwise the selection of  indicators can be 
biased by relying on what  is considered as possible or convenient to measure, and  not on 
what  information needs  to be obtained about the  safety  level  of  the  organization.   
 
The leading indicators to be used in the radiopharmaceuticals production process is presented 
in Table 1. The  list  is considered  a  pragmatic  tool  to  guide  attention  to  the relevant  
aspects, not a formal auditing check  list. The main themes are based on Wreathall’s study [9] 
and the specific contents of the themes include input from EPRI [10] and IAEA [11][12].  
 
A questionnaire will be developed according to leading indicator framework for resilience 
assessment in the radiopharmaceuticals production process located in Rio de Janeiro. The 
workers will be asked to give their opinion based on a scale. 
 
 
Table 1. The Leading Indicators  
 
Themes Indicators 
 
1. Top-level 
commitment 
1.1 The availability of sufficient workforce is ensured in order to 
ensure that time pressure does not compromise quality in safety-
critical tasks.  
1.2 The availability of sufficient material resources (tools, 
instruments) is appropriate and up-to-date. 
1.3 Owners of the radiopharmaceuticals production process show a 
commitment to safety activities. 
1.4 Safety policy is defined, reviewed and updated regularly. 
1.5 The know-how of the workers is utilized in creating and 
revising of rules, instructions and utilized in setting safety goals. 
1.6 There are clear objectives established for training programs; 
extent to which the personnel have been trained in accordance with 
planned training programme.  
INAC 2011, Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil. 
 
1.7 An adequate recruitment procedure exists for identifying 
competence needs and selecting suitable candidates. 
 
2. Learning 
culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 There is adequate information dissemination on safety issues 
and information that is relevant for work is easily accessible. 
2.2 Information flow in change of shifts situations is assured.  
2.3 The extent to which work is carried out in accordance to the 
processes, procedures and rules.  
2.4 The extent to which tasks are performed faster and more 
efficient ways and these ways are reported. 
2.5 The extent to which tasks are adapted to the circumstances on 
the field and the local adaptations are based on understanding of 
their effects on safety. 
2.6 Procedures, instructions and documentation are appropriate and 
up to date. 
2.7 Procedures, instructions and documentation are available. 
2.8 There is a system for investigation and analysis of internal 
incidents that takes into account technical, human and 
organizational factors in equal degree. 
2.9 Incident and accident investigations are conducted by 
multidisciplinary teams. 
 
3.  Flexibility 
3.1 Extent to which the personnel has been trained in technical 
areas and safety issues including uncertainties and potential 
hazards of the radiopharmaceuticals production process to cope 
with unexpected or demanding situations. 
3.2 Extent to which the personnel have suitable skills, knowledge 
and experience to carry out their tasks safely and effectively. 
3.3 The hands-on experience and skills of workers are utilized by 
foremen and managers. 
3.4 Extent to which the procedures inform the limits of safe 
working and how to detect mistakes. 
3.5 The local adaptations of the tasks are communicated by people. 
3.6 The successful local adaptations are incorporated into the 
procedure. 
 
4.  Awareness 
4.1 The extent to which there is an open atmosphere concerning 
reporting of errors, deviations and problems encountered during the 
execution of tasks. 
4.2 The personnel are informed about the overall safety level and 
current challenges on a regular basis. 
4.3 The extent to which the communication mechanisms are 
available. 
4.4 Work climate supports team work and knowledge sharing. 
4.5 tasks are allocated in a manner that promotes both work 
motivation including skill development as well as the safe and 
efficient carrying out of the given task. 
4.6 The extent to which the relations between various personnel 
groups are based on trust and shared safety norms. 
4.7 The extent to which the demands of the tasks are in line with 
the skills of the workers. 
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4.8 The extent of awareness of technical/physical condition of 
systems, structures, components and limitations of procedures and 
instructions. 
4.9 There is a program of preventive maintenance in place and it is 
revised according to maintenance.  
4.10 There are proactive measures at place to identify new risks. 
 
5.  Just culture 
5.1 Reporting of deviations, worries and own mistakes is 
encouraged by the superior. 
5.2 Superior provides fair treatment of subordinates, understanding 
that errors are natural. 
5.3 There is a clear distinction between unavoidable errors and 
unacceptable actions. 
5.4 People suffer penalties, sanctions or reprisals when they make 
mistakes. 
5.5 Peer assessments are involved in determining the outcome of 
disciplinary investigations. 
 
6.  Preparedness 
6.1 The institution as an adequate on-site emergency preparedness 
plan. 
6.2 The extent to which tasks and situations where routines may 
develop and where they might have consequences for safety are 
identified. 
6.3 Condition monitoring for safety equipment is utilized to target 
preventive maintenance. 
6.4 There is an adequate system for alarming within the enterprise 
as well as for external alarming of the people.   
6.5 There is a procedure for the identification of possible 
degradation mechanisms and monitoring the condition of safety 
critical components.  
6.6 There is regular training on emergencies on–site. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper presents a proactive tool that to provide a basis for action without waiting for 
events. In other words, this leading indicator framework provides a basis for identification 
potential problems in radiopharmaceuticals production process.  
 
Safety and resilience performance indicators can be used to signal whether the system 
provides the capabilities for adaptation during the execution of work activities so that 
workers can handle the increased demand without sacrificing system safety. As the result, the 
organizations that use resilience indicators will be able to proactively evaluate and manage 
safety. 
 
This new approach allows the discovery of resilience sources that allow workers to reach the 
success in error situations in radiopharmaceuticals production. The leading indicators can 
also be seen as tools for the authorities for implementation of a safety management model 
consistent with real-world scenarios. 
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Future plans include the development of a computational system, with a structure based on 
fuzzy logic. The fuzzy logic will be used to rank the indicators based on professional 
experience and knowledge of experts in the radiopharmaceuticals production processes.  
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